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I. INTRODUCTION
We are facing an epidemic where bribery is infiltrating the in-
ternational business realm in a way that demands immediate action.
The United States has attempted to combat this via the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in conjunction with the Organization for
Economic Co-Operation and Development (“OECD”). In addition, the
OECD’s peer-pressure influence resulted in the United Kingdom en-
acting the U.K. Bribery Act (“UKBA”) in 2011.
Taken together, these varying acts may have one believing that
corruption is facing a solid wall of enforcement legislation. On the con-
trary, the UKBA and the FCPA contain a multitude of different stan-
dards, which require companies to create two separate compliance
programs while spending millions of dollars to deal with these discrep-
ancies. The unfair disadvantage to companies trying to comply, as well
as the argued competitive disadvantage to companies from the U.K.
and U.S. respectively, has led to the need for universal anti-bribery
legislation.
These two acts set up a solid foundation, however, there needs
to be universal alignment in order to successfully combat corruption in
the global realm, and achieve international anti-bribery success. In
this Article, Part I will compare and contrast the similarities and dif-
ferences in both acts based on their language, enforcement, and prac-
tices. Part II will then discuss the effects these differences in
enforcement provisions have had on the international business arena.
Lastly, Part III will demonstrate why there is such a vital need for
universal legislation regarding anti-bribery, and will propose sample
legislation combining the most effective provisions from both acts in
an attempt to cohesively universalize the anti-bribery international
business realm. This will detail how universal legislation not only im-
proves international business, but incentivizes the world to aid in com-
bating worldwide corruption.
II. A COMPARTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UKBA AND THE FCPA
IN THE INTERNATIONAL REALM
While the FCPA and the UKBA have a common goal, their dif-
ferences have lead to a multitude of problems for multi-national corpo-
rations. Complying with different textual definitions, as well as
differing enforcement practices and defenses, such as facilitating pay-
ments and adequate procedures, creates a dichotomy that cripples in-
ternational companies actively trying to comply with both the UKBA
and the FCPA. These differences demand further legislative action so
as to aid, not hinder, international business.
While the differences between the FCPA and the UKBA high-
light the need of universal legislation, the goals and motives surround-
ing their enactment and continued enforcement remain the same. This
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combined end game drives the fight against international bribery in a
relatively cohesive manner.
1. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The FCPA was enacted in 1977 under President Jimmy Carter
as a response to widespread bribery discoveries by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”),2 as part of the investigation into the
Watergate scandal.3 The major catalyst was the investigation into
Lockheed, which uncovered a series of bribes made by officials to nego-
tiate sales of Lockheed aircrafts.4 The FCPA’s principal goal was to
effectively halt corrupt practices, and create a level playing field for
international businesses, in addition to restoring public confidence.5
While it was enacted in 1977, the Act remained relatively un-litigated
until the late 1990s.6
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act specifically prohibits pay-
ing, offering to pay, promising to pay, or authorizing someone to pay
forward anything of value to a foreign official to obtain or retain busi-
ness.7 This applies to issuers, domestic concerns, and anyone within
the limits of territorial jurisdiction.8 An issuer is someone listed on a
national securities exchange in the United States, or on an American
Depository Receipt, or a company who trades stocks “over-the-counter”
in the United States.9 A domestic concern is any United States citizen
or national, or any resident in the United States, or company organ-
ized under U.S. law, or one that has their principal place of business in
the United States.10 Put simply, there are five elements that must be
met for an FCPA violation: (1) the briber must be a U.S. citizen, busi-
2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1, 3 (2012), available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
3 Jordan Weissmann, The Corruption Law That Scares the Bejesus Out of Corpo-
rate America, The Atlantic (Apr. 25, 2012, 5:08 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2012/04/the-corruption-law-that-scares-the-bejesus-out-of-corpo-
rate-america/256314/.
4 James F. Peltz, Lockheed Agrees to Pay Record Fine: Aerospace: Calabasas Firm
Pleads Guilty in Connection with Bribing an Egyptian Politician, L.A. Times (Jan
28, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/1995-01-28/business/fi-25231_1_egyptian-
politician.
5 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 2, at 2.
6 Blank and Rome LLP, GLOBALISM AND IT’S ATTENDANT CONSEQUENCES ON FCPA
ENFORCEMENT, (Apr. 9, 2012), available at http://www.blankrome.com/index.cfm?
contentID=37&itemID=2777.
7 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(1)
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 21 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 21 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\13-3\RGL302.txt unknown Seq: 4 27-AUG-14 13:24
472 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:3
ness entity or employee of a U.S. business entity or any company listed
on a U.S. stock exchange; (2) the bribe must be made with corrupt in-
tent; (3) payment or offer of payment must be anything of value; (4) the
recipient must be a foreign government official; and (5) the bribe must
have been offered or paid to obtain or retain business.11 It is notewor-
thy that domestic concern is defined broadly, as described above. In
addition, foreign activity of private United States companies falls
within the FCPA’s scope;12 yet the FCPA does not prohibit bribes paid
to officers or employees of private, non-governmental entities.13 While
this sets up a solid foundation for any potential universal legislation,
there are loopholes that should be amended in order to make these
provisions more effective as a bribery combatant. The limit on which
types of bribes are offered is problematic and needs to be addressed
with any future legislation; however, the broad definition of domestic
concern is a good start to encompassing as many international busi-
ness actors as possible.
2. The United Kingdom Bribery Act
In the simplest of terms, the United Kingdom implemented the
Bribery Act due to the OECD bullying the United Kingdom. The
OECD did this by essentially exposing them for having a lackluster,
non-impactful, and passive anti-bribery implementation system. It
was said that the UK’s “inadequate anti-bribery laws were the subject
of constant criticism by the OECD,”14 magnified in a 2008 report pub-
lished by the OECD, which “extensively criticized the UK’s persistent
failure to address its deficient anti-corruption and anti-bribery
laws.”15 The response was an Act, implemented in 2011, which creates
new offenses and has further international reach than the scope of the
United States’ FCPA.16
A brief summation of the relevant sections of the UKBA is criti-
cal at this point. Sections 1 and 2 refer to general offenses, which pro-
hibit the giving and taking of bribes in both the public and private
sector; it also bans commercial bribery,17 which includes bribes offered
11 Sharifa G. Hunter, A Comparative Analysis of the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery
Act and the Practical Implications of Both on International Business, 18 ILSA J.
Int’l & Comp. L. 89, 94–95 (2011).
12 Id. at 94.
13 Id. at 96–97.
14 See id. at 91–92.
15 Id. at 92.
16 Id.
17 Michael Fine, Coordinating U.K. Bribery Act and FCPA Compliance, LRN 2, 11
(2011), http://www.lrn.com/sites/default/files/Coordinating%20UK%20Bribery%20
Act%20and%20FCPA%20Compliance_0.pdf.
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or paid in connection with purely commercial activities.18 Provision-
ally, this is very broad and extends to any activity “connected with
business, performed in the course of a person’s employment or per-
formed on behalf of a company.”19 Section 7 establishes a new corpo-
rate offense for failing to prevent bribery with the exception of proof of
adequate reporting procedures in place.20 This Section applies to any
company which “carries on a business or part of a business” in the U.K.
regardless of where the offense takes place.21 The UKBA’s general of-
fenses prohibit bribery of any person; this includes non-public officials,
with the intent to induce improper performance of a relevant duty.22
There are four separate offenses under the UKBA: bribing, be-
ing bribed, bribing a foreign public official, and failing as a commercial
organization to prevent bribery.23 These are governed by a “close con-
nection” test, with no corrupt intent required, and primarily deal with
inducements to improperly perform a relevant duty, agreeing to re-
ceive a bribe, and the strict liability corporate offense of failing to pre-
vent bribery.24 This added offense of failing to prevent bribery is a
huge step forward in combating international corruption. It builds off
the provisions of the FCPA and holds an even larger group of people
and entities accountable for any act of bribery, or feigned ignorance, in
regards to bribery’s impact on international business deals. This provi-
sion greatly expands who is subjected to accountability under anti-
bribery legislation. However, the implementation of this provision
under the UKBA, with a complete absence of any similar provision in
the FCPA creates an international regulation divide, which leads to
numerous problems for complying companies.
The most important similarities between the FCPA and the
UKBA are in the plain text. Most notable, are their similar definitions
of public official, as well as the fact that their actual practice in most
areas may not substantially differ.25 In addition, they are both vague
on payments. The FCPA does not define “anything of value,” while the
UKBA simply says “any other financial or other advantage.”26 This
ambiguity can lead to differing enforcement practices. Their extrater-
ritorial provisions, as will be discussed in further detail later, are simi-
lar in reach, with the UKBA being slightly broader. Most importantly
however, both acts’ ideals and goals mirror one another.
18 Id. at 11.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 2–3.
21 Id. at 3.
22 Id. at 6.
23 See Hunter, supra note 11, at 93–95.
24 Id. at 95–96.
25 See Fine, supra note 17, at 3.
26 Id. at 7.
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3. Differences Between the FCPA and the UKBA Lead to
Inconsistencies, Leading to a Call for Universal Legislation
The differences between the Acts lead to potentially duplicative
enforcement and undefined ambiguity, leaving multi-national corpora-
tions in the dark as to how best to decipher the inconsistencies in de-
termining how to effectively frame their internal compliance
provisions. The differences range from language discrepancies, to ex-
ceptions, to affirmative defenses, to penalties, and to compliance. All of
which are vital in the enforcement of these acts and create a dichotomy
which businesses are left to define.
The FCPA deals with bribery of foreign officials, while the
UKBA deals with bribes to any person.27 This discrepancy creates am-
biguity with regard to whom companies can conduct different aspects
of their business. In addition, the FPCA deals with payment to obtain
or retain business, while the UKBA deals with intention to induce im-
proper performance.28 Not only are these both imprecise in regards to
what meets their requirements, but they also show that at the very
foundation of both acts, bribery is defined differently. This discrepancy
is not an effective international bribery combatant.
While the definitions of bribery remain dissimilar, there is also
the concern of intent. The FCPA requires corrupt intent, while the
UKBA requires intent to induce, not necessarily in a corrupt man-
ner.29 The differences in intent requirements can lead to abstruseness
and, effectively, a gray area for companies trying to conduct business
within the provisions of these acts. In addition, the FCPA limits their
corporate strict liability to accounting provisions, under a “Books and
Records Provision” while the UKBA established a new offense of fail-
ure by a commercial organization to prevent bribery.30 One Act re-
quires your books and records to be on display, while the other holds
you accountable for not stopping bribery. This creates a level of ambi-
guity that makes it incredibly difficult, if not impossible, for interna-
tional companies to effectively and efficiently regulate against bribery.
There are also significant differences in their senior official liability.
To be liable, the FCPA requires that the senior official simply fail to
adequately supervise the conduct of those that work for him,31 while
the UKBA requires the senior official to “consent or connive” in the act
of bribery.32 These differences could be significant in the event of liti-
27 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977); U.K. Bribery Act, 2011, c. 23 (Eng.)
[hereafter U.K. Bribery Act].
28 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977); U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 27.
29 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977); U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 27.
30 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2; U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 27.
31 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977).
32 U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 27, at § 14.
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gation. If under one act, a senior official is liable due to his position,
but under the other act, he is liable only if there is consent, then this
clearly creates a problem for any and all international corporations.
One of the most significant linguistic differences between the
Acts is how they define their extraterritorial jurisdictional limits. The
FCPA includes anything listed on the U.S. stock exchange, as well as
U.S. companies, or companies with their principal place of business in
the U.S.33 The UKBA does not have the stock exchange provision,
however, the UKBA follows a “conducting business” requirement
where even part of their business activities being conducted in the
U.K. will satisfy to afford jurisdiction under the Bribery Act.34 This
“conducting business” provision has the potential to reach numerous
international companies that have very little connection with the U.K.
This creates the potential for corporate susceptibility at a “signifi-
cantly greater” level than what is provided under the FCPA.35 In addi-
tion, the UKBA prohibits both public and commercial bribery, another
provision not accounted for under the FCPA.36 By expanding their ju-
risdiction in this way, the UKBA inevitably holds more people account-
able to bribery violations, while the FCPA does not. Lastly, the FCPA
provides for successor liability, where the parent company can be held
liable for past anti-bribery violations of a company, even if it happened
before the acquisition;37 alternatively, the Bribery Act leaves open
whether there is successor liability over acquired companies or not.38
With the ever-expanding international business realm, the issue of
successor liability has become a provision that affects most multi-na-
tional corporations during their day-to-day operations. With this high
standard for successor liability, and with no remedy for ‘good behavior’
or adequate provisions, the FCPA holds corporations accountable at a
new level, potentially stalling the progressive expansion of interna-
tional business.
These examples of differences are merely based on the plain
text of the Acts. As we look toward the application side of both Acts, it
will reaffirm that there is a significant enforcement problem due to
these discrepancies for international companies: a problem that needs
to be resolved sooner rather than later. This multitude of discrepancies
requires multi-national corporations to expense numerous hours and
immeasurable finances on complying with small differences between
33 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977); U.K. Bribery Act, supra note 27.
34 See generally U.K. Bribery Act, 2011, c. 23 (Eng.).
35 Fine, supra note 17, at 11.
36 Hunter, supra note 11, at 97.
37 U.K. Bribery Act and Its Effect on U.S. Companies, Murphy & King, (May
2011), http://www.murphyking.com/newsevents/uUK_Bribery_Act_and_its_Effect
_on_US_Companiesu/.
38 Id.
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 23 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
35295-rgl_13-3 Sheet No. 23 Side B      09/09/2014   14:33:00
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\R\RGL\13-3\RGL302.txt unknown Seq: 8 27-AUG-14 13:24
476 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 13:3
each act in an attempt to combat bribery. This seems excessive and
taxing on corporations simply trying to comply.
A. Facilitating Payments
Facilitating payments is an area where the discrepancies
greatly hurt international business and lead to the above-mentioned
duplicative enforcement. For example, the FCPA allows facilitating or
grease payments, which are made to expedite or secure the perform-
ance of routine governmental actions.39 On the other hand, the UKBA
will offer no exception for facilitating payments, unless it is a payment
allowed by local law;40 the UKBA holds a zero tolerance policy for any
type of facilitating payments.41 The FCPA exception allows payments
that “merely move a particular matter toward an eventual end.”42 This
would most likely include gratuities to customs officials in order to ex-
pedite customs documents. The lack of exception under the UKBA
causes U.K. companies to be placed at a competitive disadvantage.43
Another disadvantage to U.K. companies is the ambiguity regarding
prosecution of these facilitating payments. While the Serious Fraud
Office (“SFO”), the chief enforcement agency of the UKBA, has contin-
uously stated that they do not anticipate many prosecutions regarding
facilitating payments,44 the government has discussed their serious-
ness in eliminating facilitating payments worldwide and has ex-
pressed interest in doing so via aggressive prosecutions.45 This
disastrously large discrepancy between the two Acts causes a multi-
tude of practical business problems. It fosters different everyday busi-
ness practices depending on which Act’s jurisdiction a corporation is
complying with in an operational sense. For example, one company
dealing with shipping to different areas could potentially have to deal
with using facilitating payments for one shipment, while they are pro-
hibited from using facilitating payments for the other shipment. This
causes companies to have to comply with different regulations for the
same business practices. This hardly seems practical or efficient. This
very notion exemplifies the call for uniformity among anti-bribery acts.
B. Affirmative Defenses
The differences between the FCPA and the UKBA regarding
affirmative defenses might be one of the most difficult discrepancies
39 See Hunter, supra note 11, at 99.
40 Id. at 100.
41 See Fine, supra note 17, at 18.
42 Hunter, supra note 11, at 99-100.
43 Id. at 100.
44 Id.
45 Fine, supra note 17, at 19.
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for companies to overcome. In short, the FCPA allows for reasonable
and bona fide expenditures as long as it complies with local laws.46
These reasonable bona fide expenditures can include payments of gifts
or anything of value, if lawful under the written laws of the region or if
it was directly related to the promotion, demonstration, or execution of
performance of the contract with a foreign government or agency.47
For example, this includes travel and lodging expenses, meals, etc.
This however excludes any payments made with corrupt intent, which
would effectively void any bona fide expenditures defense.
The UKBA has no similar defense. That being said, guidance
from the U.K.’s Ministry of Justice has strongly implied that reasona-
ble and proportionate promotional expenditures will be allowed as long
as they remain small and do not constitute a pattern.48 But what does
this mean in practice? An interesting development under the UKBA
has been the application of a national security defense. If something
conflicts with national security issues, then it can preclude any
prosecutorial action for UKBA violations.49 This was evidenced in the
BAE Systems case where Tony Blair was concerned about a terrorist
attack if prosecutorial actions were commenced any further, and so the
investigation was essentially halted on national security grounds.50
The FCPA has no such provision. However, this begs the question,
what is a national security ground? How broad does that exception
reach? This uncertainty in prosecutorial conduct once again leaves
companies in an undefined gray area.
C. Compliance Defense
One of the biggest critiques of the FCPA is its lack of a compli-
ance defense, especially in light of the UKBA’s prominent stance on
compliance defenses. In continued efforts of ambiguousness all-
around, the U.S. enforcement authorities have said they will take com-
pliance into consideration during prosecutions.51 However, in action,
companies are generally credited for good practice, but the effects of
the “good deeds” usually only affect the sentencing areas of prosecu-
tion.52 It affords little-to-no aid anywhere else in the prosecutorial sys-
tem. There has been large critique over the FCPA’s lack of compliance
program; many have pushed toward a compliance program’s positive
46 Hunter, supra note 11, at 101.
47 Id. at 101–02.
48 Id. at 102.
49 Fine, supra note 17, at 20.
50 Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L. L. 1, 23 (2012).
51 Hunter, supra note 11, at 104.
52 Fine, supra note 17, at 21.
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effects, given the UKBA’s provision. Critics argue it would be invalua-
ble to protect U.S. companies operating overseas.53
The Adequate Procedures Provision, a compliance defense to
corporate liability under the UKBA, affords companies certain levels of
complete deniability if they can demonstrate adequate procedures
were in place and geared towards preventing bribery.54 This defense to
liability for each provision of the UKBA greatly aids corporations in
conducting their businesses efficiently. These procedures aided in
preventing those associated with the company from engaging in con-
duct that would result in violations of the Act.55 Some examples of the
adequate procedures are laid out in Section 7 of the Act: overall pro-
gram design, tone at the top, risk assessment, due diligence, communi-
cation (including training), and monitoring and review.56 If companies
fail to demonstrate adequate procedures, there is a strict liability of-
fense. However, if there are adequate procedures in place, the com-
pany is “off the hook” for violations. This discrepancy is too wide. One
Act allows and the other does not, which leaves companies unsure of
whether their actions amount to a violation.
D. These Inconsistencies Lead to Varying Enforcement Patterns for
Multi-National Corporations, Creating Difficulty for Adequate
Compliance
Due to linguistic differences in both Acts, enforcement and re-
medial measures have greatly differed, as have each enforcement
agencies’ practices. The FCPA has led the way in various additional
enforcement actions to hold multi-national corporations accountable,
while the UKBA’s stringent enforcement policies could potentially fail
under the realities of the business world.
i. FCPA Enforcement
While the United States’ Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) both have jurisdiction
over certain issuers and domestic concerns, most cases never actually
get to trial. Almost all FCPA issues are resolved via non-prosecution
agreements and deferred prosecution agreements.57 A non-prosecution
agreement, or NPA, is a privately negotiated agreement between the
DOJ and the violating company, where the DOJ agrees not to prose-
cute under the condition that the company admits fault and agrees to
53 Hunter, supra note 11, at 106.
54 Id. at 103.
55 Id. at 106.
56 See Hunter, supra note 17, at 21.
57 FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR (2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101.
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compliance undertakings.58 NPAs are not filed with a court.59 A de-
ferred prosecution agreement, or DPA, is technically filed with a court
and has the same appearance as a criminal indictment, however, here
the DOJ agrees to defer prosecution of the company if it acknowledges
responsibility and again agrees to host compliance undertakings.60
Under these agreements, the companies have to acknowledge fault or
responsibility, but they do not have to plead guilty to any charges, and
they are never found in violation of the FCPA; consequently, they are
not debarred.61 Under the FCPA provisions, if one is charged and
found guilty, debarment is a potential consequence, which is a huge
catalyst behind the increasing use of NPAs and DPAs within the
U.S.62
While it may be perceived in the press that companies are con-
tinuously convicted of anti-bribery violations, it is not in fact the case.
For example, Siemens, who had to pay approximately $800 million to
U.S. authorities as an FCPA settlement, was never convicted of FCPA
violations.63 As stated above, if they had been convicted, they may
have been debarred from doing business in the United States. Instead,
Siemens simply settled under an agreement with the U.S. govern-
ment. The same is true for BAE Systems, a well-known case in 2010
regarding bribes to Saudi public officials.64 BAE was also never con-
victed of FCPA violations.65 Both companies settled under various
NPAs and DPAs. The DOJ has said that the issue of debarment was a
significant factor in why they did not charge Siemens or BAE with
FCPA anti-bribery violations.66 If there were different end results, one
that either afforded companies a compliance defense under the FCPA,
such as the UKBA’s adequate procedures defense, or offered solutions
other than debarment, then maybe the DOJ would not have to rely so
heavily on the NPAs and DPAs. That being said, NPAs and DPAs are a
couple of the best available solutions for anti-corruption, creating a
level of accountability without completely crippling an international
corporation.
In addition, FCPA actions have increased rapidly over the last
few years for both the DOJ and the SEC. The SEC claims it gets about
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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eight tips a day.67 That being said, the fines are rarely as high as one
might expect.68 FCPA violations have spread vastly around the world,
with the most prevalent area for bribery being China, followed by Iraq,
and Nigeria.69 Due to the world’s increased manufacturing presence in
China, it is no surprise that bribery in China is magnified. In addition,
it is common knowledge that bribery is rampant in the course of busi-
ness in India. This leads to a ‘cost of doing business’ argument, which
will be discussed below. Investigations in the United States totaled
106 investigations in 2010 and 113 in 2011, whereas the total number
of cases in those years respectively was 227 and 275.70 In addition, the
SEC had thirteen actions brought in 2011, eight of which were re-
solved through consent judgments, four were resolved through admin-
istrative cease and desist orders, and one was resolved through a
DPA.71 In contrast, the DOJ brought only one contested action in
2011, and ten other criminal cases, most of which were resolved either
through a NPA or a DPA.72 FCPA enforcement has increased over the
years because of these alternatives: “wha[t has] really changed is not
so much the legislation, but the enforcement and approach to enforce-
ment by U.S. authorities.”73 These numbers show that bribery re-
mains a major thorn in the realm of international business. It has not
lessened, and in fact has become more prevalent in countries that are
expanding further into the global business world. The FCPA’s NPAs
and DPAs afford an additional type of enforcement, which punishes
the appropriate violators without creating an international debarment
issue. This increase in FCPA cases further shows the demand for a
new level of enforcement action to combat the growing bribery
problems.
67 Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues First Whistleblower Program
Award (Aug. 21, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1365171483972#.U1feZFewVRI.
68 See generally FCPA Digest: Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to
Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Shearman &
Sterling LLP, Jan. 2012, http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/
Publications/2012/01/Shearman%20%20Sterlings%20Recent%20Trends%20and%
20Patterns%20i__/Files/View%20full%20January%202012%20iFCPA%20Digesti/
FileAttachment/FCPADigestJan2012.pdf.
69 Id. at xi. (Asia (excluding China) 20%, China 9%, Middle East (excluding Iraq)
10%, Iraq 9%, Central Asia and Russia 8%, Europe 12%, Africa (excluding Nigeria)
9%, Nigeria 9%, and the Americas 14%).
70 FCPA and U.K. Bribery Act Enforcement and Compliance in 2012, Navigant
(Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://www.securitiesdocket.com/wp-content/uploads/
2012/09/Sept-28-2012-Consolidated.pdf.
71 See Shearman & Sterling LLP, supra note 68, at xii.
72 Id. at xi.
73 FCPA 101, supra note 57.
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This lack of actual enforcement and heavy reliance on NPAs
and DPAs urges us to ask the question: should the FCPA enforcement
action procedures be restructured to better reflect the actual goings-
on? Should there be explicit language discussing the NPAs and DPAs
in more depth? If almost all of the prosecution is going to be through
these agreements, shouldn’t the UKBA also have these procedures?
What will the UKBA do when it comes time to prosecute without this
alternative? More enforcement leads to further compliance in a coun-
try hesitant to change due to lackluster rulings. DPAs and NPAs bring
that raised level of enforcement.
ii. UKBA Enforcement
The UKBA does not have a remedy equivalent to the FCPA’s
NPAs and DPAs, which could greatly cripple their enforcement capa-
bilities. The SFO recently revised its enforcement policies in October
2012 to restate the SFO’s primary role as investigator, to ensure con-
sistency, and to meet certain OECD requirements.74 The newfound
provisions provide for a “Full Code Test,” which requires sufficient evi-
dence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction as well as evidence
that the prosecution is in the public’s interest.75 The SFO goes on to
clarify that they will not waiver in regard to facilitating payments –
small amounts will be unacceptable in the course of doing business –
and that facilitating payments are illegal in the U.K. irrespective of
their size or frequency.76 Lastly, the SFO declared a focus on investi-
gating business expenditures77 without truly defining what these busi-
ness expenditures entailed.78 These new provisions hardly seem
revolutionary. In fact, they seem to attempt to provide clarity without
clearly defining what facilitating payments or business expenditures
really are.
In addition, the lingering question of what the UKBA enforce-
ment will actually look like in light of these revisions is something we
must look into, in anticipation of creating a structure for universal leg-
islation. These revisions to the UKBA came about due to the continued
critique that the prosecutorial appetite of the SFO was minimal. The
U.K. investigated a total of seventeen cases in 2010 and twenty-three
in 2011.79 That being said, there have been only a few prosecutions
74 U.K. Bribery Act: SFO Revises Enforcement Policies, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost,
Colt & Mosle LLP, Nov. 2012, http://www.curtis.com/siteFiles/Publications/SFO
%20Revised%20Policies.pdf.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 See Navigant, supra note 70.
79 Id.
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under the Bribery Act to date, and most have involved individuals
rather than corporations.80 However, while the critics comment that
the SFO’s prosecutorial appetite is small, and while it may very well
be minimal, one major reason for the lack of cases is because the Brib-
ery Act does not act retrospectively.81 The SFO is limited in their en-
forcement of any new provisions to bribes occurring after the
enactment of the UKBA in July 2011, and one must also factor in time
to conduct an investigation.82 While enforcement will most likely re-
main limited for the foreseeable future, when it does occur, the U.K. is
going to have to revise the Bribery Act. It will have to come up with
some sort of solution to the lack of clarity and ambiguous provisions,
which do not mirror the FCPA. Universal legislation could solve all of
these problems at once. As soon as the SFO begins to increasingly and
proactively regulate on an international scale, these companies will
have a more escalated problem in dealing with issues such as, elimi-
nating loopholes, defining the gray area, and avoiding duplicative en-
forcement by spending millions of dollars on varying degrees of
compliance to each country’s individual Act(s).
III. DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE FCPA AND THE UKBA
CREATE DUPLICATIVE ENFORCEMENT AS WELL AS A
COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE
Whether one is looking at the potential harm of duplicative en-
forcement for multi-national corporations, or analyzing the lack of en-
forcement power of the OECD, it is clear that there is a desperate need
for a solution. These differing provisions have so far been unsuccessful
in solving the infectious bribery epidemic; in fact, the discrepancies are
facilitating it. An act with universal enforcement jurisdiction needs to
be implemented to properly fight for the fundamental goals estab-
lished under the FCPA and the UKBA.
1. Universal Legislation Is Necessary to Remedy Duplicative
Enforcement
The potential for duplicative enforcement causes a vast logisti-
cal problem within the international business realm, and must be rem-
edied via universal legislation. Universal anti-bribery enforcement is
necessary to combat the growing encroachment of duplicative enforce-
80 See, e.g., Court Clerk Munir Patel Jailed for Taking Bribes, BBC NEWS, Nov. 18,
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-15689869.
81 See Bribery and Corruption, ASHURST LLP 5, Feb. 2014, https://www.google.
com/url?q=http://www.ashurst.com/doc.aspx%3Fid_Resource%3D4649&sa=U&ei=
w51RU9CpEPSosQTUsIHIBg&ved=0CBsQFjAA&usg=AFQjCNG7T4f5fSI5djEIm
30MDvj2zgJ0DA.
82 See id.
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ment. Whether through extended extraterritorial reach, or enactment
of a compliance defense in the FCPA, there needs to be a solution to
the continuing trend of duplicative enforcement problems for multi-
national corporations.
The most practical way to solve the potential for increased du-
plicative enforcement issues is to create a universal anti-bribery en-
forcement system to combat corruption in the international business
world. Duplicative enforcement is not a hypothetical; there have al-
ready been cases where companies have been brought to justice under
more than one Act.
The first case is Siemens. Siemens was under investigation by
the DOJ and the SEC, as well as the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Of-
fice.83 Siemens successfully cooperated with both countries, but none-
theless ended up having to pay significant fines in both jurisdictions
for the same offense.84 BAE, as discussed previously, was due for trial
in the United Kingdom, and then under the umbrella of national se-
curity concerns, Tony Blair called off the investigation.85 Soon after,
the United States’ DOJ initiated its own investigation into BAE Sys-
tems, leading to the establishment of a cooperative prosecution by the
two countries.86
In addition, Halliburton/TSKJ has recently come into some
anti-bribery concerns. Their troubles spanned over twelve different ju-
risdictions.87 Currently, the DOJ has spearheaded the investigation
encouraging the SFO to take a back seat. If there is cooperation, this
twelve-jurisdiction claim could result in Halliburton/TSKJ being pros-
ecuted in one area alone. However, if international agency cooperation
is unsuccessful, Halliburton/TSKJ could end up with duplicative in-
vestigations in multiple regions around the world. Lastly, there is In-
nospec. This situation deals with the U.K.’s SFO taking over a case
after enforcement competition with the United States.88 After the
agencies decided that the SFO would lead the investigation, there was
cooperation from three U.S. agencies, which helped lead the SFO to
one of their first global settlements.89
This idea of cooperative efforts works well in theory, and so far
has not caused many international problems. However, what happens
83 See Spahn, supra note 50, at 26–27.
84 Id. at 26 n.133, 27.
85 See David Leigh & Rob Evans, Blair Called for BAE Inquiry to be Halted,
Guardian, Dec. 22, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/baefiles/story/0,,2231496,00.
html.
86 See Spahn, supra note 50, at 25.
87 Id. at 27.
88 Id. at 31.
89 Id.
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when both countries want to prosecute? Does the company then have
to deal with investigations in numerous arenas under different Acts
with various criteria? Under the current laws, yes.
There is potential for all of this to change. There are currently
two international investigations pending which could set the stage for
the next wave of anti-bribery enforcement. The DOJ is investigating
Wal-Mart, while the SFO is investigating Rolls Royce. Both cases have
the ability to set major precedent in which direction each Act’s enforce-
ment will trend. In both cases, the companies are helping with the in-
vestigation by providing the DOJ and SFO, respectively, with
information regarding their company’s practices in various countries
around the globe.
Wal-Mart has reacted by taking a defensive, yet active stance:
it has fired most of the executives that were involved in the bribery
allegations,90 and as the investigation expanded into India, the Bharti
Wal-Mart suspended its CFO and its legal team for the entire coun-
try.91 It has also publicly stated its cooperation numerous times92 in
addition to conducting a “worldwide review of its compliance controls,”
it is also already making substantial changes to its infrastructure,
such as updating compliance procedures, which has cost around $30
million.93 Furthermore, Wal-Mart hired a new head of international
legal compliance in an effort to centralize its compliance in interna-
tional operations (totaling 26 countries).94 They claim this hiring is
“consistent with their ongoing efforts,” such as strengthening their
compliance programs through concrete actions.95
On the other side, the SFO has begun an investigation into
Rolls Royce, which makes aircraft engines. This investigation is based
on whistleblower information regarding the company’s violations of
anti-bribery law in China and Indonesia.96 Due to the company con-
90 Susana G. Baumann, Expansion of Wal-Mart Stores In Mexico Comes With A
High Price: Bribery And Corruption, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2013, 10:13 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/expansion-walmart-mexico_n_2431694
.html.
91 Rasul Bailay & Chaitali Chakravarty, Bharti Wal-Mart Suspends CFO, Legal
Team in Bribery Probe, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Nov. 23, 2012, 7:35 AM), http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Bharti-Wal-Mart-suspends-
CFO-legal-team-in-bribery-probe/articleshow/17331568.cms.
92 Christopher M. Matthews, Wal-Mart FCPA Probe Grows, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15,
2012, 5:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/11/15/wal-mart-
fcpa-probe-grows/.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Michael Volkov, A Status Check on the U.K. Bribery Act, JDSUPRA, Feb. 4, 2013,
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-status-check-on-the-uk-bribery-act-67032/.
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ducting some of its business in the U.K., Rolls Royce availed itself of
the Bribery Act’s jurisdiction. The debate in this case is whether or not
the SFO will prosecute. There has been much speculation that the
SFO may prosecute this case because of the public perception that
they prefer civil settlements to criminal prosecutions.97
These cases have the potential to shape foreign bribery laws.
Wal-Mart could potentially be tried for bribery violations in the U.S.,
India, China, and Brazil, among other nations, while Rolls Royce could
potentially be tried for bribery violations in the U.K., China, and Indo-
nesia. Both of these companies could be liable in different countries
under differing Acts, for the same exact bribes. How is this fair? Each
company should definitely be held accountable for their actions, how-
ever this form of duplicative enforcement, which borders on double
jeopardy, is not the way to accomplish it. What if there was one act
with the same jurisdiction, penalties, and enforcement? Would this
stop a potential duplicative prosecution?
2. Because the OECD Lacks Enforcement Power, Establishment of
an Act with Universal Enforcement Jurisdiction Is Imperative
The OECD Working Group has previously attempted to ad-
dress concerns raised due to these multijurisdictional bribery prosecu-
tions. The Working Group discussed the possibility of establishing
certain criteria for a single jurisdiction prosecution, however, nothing
was agreed upon.98 The OECD’s apparent lack of enforcement power
distances it from being promising legislation, and closer to simply be-
ing effective monitoring and policing.
It has been argued that there is no need for universality be-
cause the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery has been in effect
since 1997.99 However, ironically enough, the OECD developed this
branch to combat bribery due to pressure from the United States,100
stemming from corruption concerns and unfair competitive disadvan-
tages to U.S. companies due to the United States’ FCPA provisions.
The OECD’s main goals are to encourage various sanctions against
bribery, encourage countries to make bribery illegal, and to level the
international business playing field.101 The OECD operates under a
97 Id.
98 See Spahn, supra note 50, at 23.
99 Andrew Tyler, Enforcing Enforcement: Is the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s
Peer Review Effective?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 137, 138 (2011).
100 Id.
101 See generally Exporting Corruption? Country Enforcement of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, Progress Report 2012, Sept. 6, 2012, available at http://www.
transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/exporting_corruption_country_enforcement_of_
the_oecd_anti_bribery_convention.
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“horizontal enforcement model in which each signatory state enforces
against foreign bribery through its own distinct domestic legal sys-
tem.”102 However, this horizontal enforcement model has little to no
enforcement power.
The OECD includes a provision requiring signatories to make
it a crime to bribe foreign officials during international business trans-
actions.103 However, despite this provision’s enactment fifteen years
ago, there is still not full compliance. The OECD does however boast
that there has been significant success in implementation through its
peer-review process (similar to the way it pushed the U.K. to enact the
Bribery Act).104 The OECD historically chastised countries in an at-
tempt to drive them to fix their enforcement actions and make peer-
review processes more actionable.105 In short, the OECD has past suc-
cess in its peer-pressure format, but lacks the jurisdiction to actively
implement any universal enforcement mechanisms. The Convention
also lacked the ability to change worldwide levels in corruption accord-
ing to recent studies, which reveal shortcomings in the Convention it-
self.106 The study shows public perception of limited enforcement
possibilities, and a call for facilitation payments, further international
cooperation, greater whistleblower protection, and broader prevent-
ative measures, yet the problems inevitably circle back to the OECD’s
lack of enforcement power.107
There are only four countries that actively enforce anti-bribery
measures as a result of the OECD’s push, and there are fifteen coun-
tries that enforce a moderate level of anti-bribery legislation.108 Its fu-
ture is in serious jeopardy because there are a limited number of
parties who adequately enforce the Convention.109 The most influen-
tial signatories to the OECD are the United States, the United King-
dom, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, and Germany.110 The
entire success of the OECD hinges upon the signatory countries imple-
102 Spahn, supra note 50, at 49.
103 Tyler, supra note 99, at 137.
104 Id. at 139.
105 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Time to Take Real Steps, OECD Insights,
(May 25, 2011), http://oecdinsights.org/2011/05/25/oecd-anti-bribery-convention-
time-to-take-real-steps/.
106 Tyler, supra note 99, at 166.
107 Id. at 163.
108 Id. at 168.
109 Report Cards, FCPA PROFESSOR, June 30, 2011, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
report-cards-3.
110 Exporting Corruption, supra note 101, at 8.
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menting the OECD’s suggestions.111 How does the OECD combat that
implementation problem without the power to do so, and without be-
coming a universal enforcement act?
IV. THE DESPERATE NEED FOR A SOLUTION
The inconsistencies’ effect on enforcement causes bribery to
slip through gaps in enforcement power and remain prominent in the
international business realm. Bribery has an enormously damaging ef-
fect on international business. “Bribery. . .inhibits free trade and eco-
nomic development in many countries by undermining competition in
these international markets.”112 Setting up a system of international
business soaked in bribery creates unfair advantages to more devel-
oped countries, which can afford to pay the bribes and do not have
anti-bribery legislation. It also gives an advantage to bigger and more
affluent companies. The World Bank echoed this sentiment by saying,
“corruption has a negative relationship with per capita GDP. . .lowers
the quality of public infrastructure. . .lowers public satisfac-
tion. . .undermines the official economy, and reduces the effectiveness
of development aid and increases inequality and poverty.”113 The in-
consistencies within the two Acts exacerbate these problems on a
global scale. They lead to unfair advantages, a multitude of expenses,
and duplicative enforcement, all while deterring business due to unfair
competitive disadvantages. This problem can be fixed.
The FCPA and UKBA’s immense impact has been an ideal first
step in combating bribery, but the Acts can only take it so far. Ten
years ago, bribes were a culturally acceptable business practice. They
led to long-standing relationships, and were even tax deductible in Eu-
rope.114 Now everything has changed. The OECD has pushed for fur-
ther regulation and the countries have complied. The FCPA has
“become a major legal issue for all multinational companies across va-
rious industry sectors” as it has surged to the forefront of these corpo-
rations’ concerns.115 The UKBA is likely to quickly follow in its
footsteps. How do we smooth this transition so we remain active in the
fight against bribery and corruption while maintaining international
business’s fervor?
111 Luke Balleny, Enforcement of Danish Foreign Bribery Laws, TRUSTLAW, (Mar.
22, 2013, 12:39 PM), http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/enforcement-of-danish-
foreign-bribery-laws-weak-oecd-report/.
112 See Hunter, supra note 10, at 90.
113 Id.
114 Patrick Hughes, How the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is Changing Interna-
tional Business Practices, ALBANY-COLONIE REGIONAL CHAMBER, http://acchamber.
org/MediaCenter/businesslibrary/ForeignCorruptPracticesAct.aspx.
115 Id.
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First of all, there needs to be a way to eliminate the ambiguity
in the Acts. For example, the concept of both “bribe” and “foreign offi-
cial” are so vaguely defined in both the FCPA and the UKBA that it is
better to simply not give money to anyone, however, that has proven to
be impractical. Another problem is the indistinctness in definitions of
bona fide expenditures. While these are not present in the UKBA, the
FCPA’s guidelines on “wining and dining” leave too much room for in-
terpretation. Companies need to know where the line is between sim-
ply taking someone out to dinner and an anti-bribery violation. There
needs to be a line drawn that allows for more clarity. Further clarifica-
tions would allow companies to operate knowing exactly what can and
cannot be done, while helping to minimize the competitive disadvan-
tage companies subject to FCPA and UKBA jurisdiction have in the
international business world. As shown above, the vagueness in which
each act defines certain key terms leads to a large disadvantage to all
multi-national corporations. It comes down to this: companies cannot
actively or effectively combat bribery while maintaining business and
complying with these separate Acts if the rules, regulations, and provi-
sions are not laid out coherently across all continents. A universal act,
or a form of universal legislation, would accomplish these desperately
needed goals. While both the FCPA and the UKBA have had a great
impact on fighting bribery, the impact needs to expand into a univer-
sal blanketed act, which clearly defines what companies are expected
to do.
The impact of the FCPA alone has been astronomical. How-
ever, being the first major act with direct enforcement action has
caused the United States to feel like they are fighting this battle alone,
which greatly harms U.S. based companies in a competitive interna-
tional realm. The costs, both competitively and financially, are
substantial.
Besides immediate financial concerns, when a company subject
to the FCPA is competing with another company to acquire a third
company, the U.S. company has to factor in numerous additional costs
for compliance, giving them a competitive disadvantage in the market;
the same initial disadvantage applies to companies under the arm of
the UKBA. This creates a huge logistical problem for companies trying
to comply with the proper anti-bribery provisions of the UKBA and
FCPA. In addition, the UKBA has been deemed the “strictest anti-cor-
ruption legislation to date.”116 The FCPA has been the world leader in
enforcing anti-corruption legislation; however, this could all change if
the prosecutorial appetite of the SFO grows. Without further instruc-
tion, the strictness of these Acts could lead to further international
business problems due to ambiguous enforcement standards.
116 Id. at 109.
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It is incredibly costly to keep companies’ anti-bribery provi-
sions up to date due to the differing Acts. In order to maintain a level
playing field, there should be one system. This would allow companies
to establish an effective internal system to combat bribery on an inter-
national level, while being able to continue to conduct business suc-
cessfully. These discrepancies are crippling companies. Not only are
those companies who are complying forced to deal with an uneven
playing field in comparison to those companies not under the jurisdic-
tion of either Act, but these companies are also expected to spend an
unreasonable amount of time and money complying with two rela-
tively different lists of provisions. To effectively meet the requirements
of each Act, due to their multitude of differences, companies are spend-
ing countless hours trying to come up with a proper internal system,
which takes away from international business progress. There should
be a system, with global enforcement power, so companies can reason-
ably focus on one internal compliance system and still be able to effec-
tively compete in the international realm, while combating bribery.
The crux of the problem is that FCPA compliance does not
equate to Bribery Act compliance. There needs to be universality.
There needs to be a “meaningful international alignment of the world’s
leading economic powers” to combat bribery.117 There is concern that
the British Government’s rigid implementation of Bribery Act provi-
sions could cause companies to terminate various foreign relationships
in an effort to avoid prosecution.118 For example, because the Bribery
Act does not impose a facilitating payments exception, it could cause
companies associated with the U.K. to impose a higher cost when do-
ing business, and in return, cause a competitive disadvantage, as
shown above with the FCPA. This has been the worry of companies
from the beginning, setting up this unfair disadvantage concern due to
their home country. A universal act would change that. Bribery
greatly increases the cost of doing business worldwide, but now with
differing legislative requirements, compliance to combat bribery is be-
coming an additional exorbitant cost as well. These increasing costs
can acts as a disincentive that impedes further international business
expansion: a consequence that businesses cannot afford.
117 Comm. on Int’l Bus. Transactions, The FCPA and Its Impact on International
Business Transactions – Should Anything Be Done to Minimize the Consequences
of the U.S.’s Unique Position on Combating Offshore Corruption? N.Y.C. BAR
ASS’N, 25 (Dec. 2011), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAImpacton
InternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf.
118 Hunter, supra note 11, at 110.
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1. How to Accomplish Universal Legislation
The extraterritorial reach of both acts pushes towards univer-
sal jurisdiction. The FCPA has prosecuted companies all across the
world, and the UKBA’s extraterritorial reach is even broader with its
“close connection” test and offense for failure to prevent bribes. These
trends are causing multinational corporations with connections to both
countries to become nervous,119 and rightly so. On the other hand, it is
forcing them to become more familiar with the acts and look at their
own compliance standards, which is the goal. Global companies now
have to be aware that both the FCPA and the UKBA can directly im-
pact their operations, even if they only have limited activity within the
U.S. and the U.K., ultimately forcing them to create more effective
anti-corruption internal programs.120 While this extraterritorial reach
is impressive, it creates gaps in enforcement, which will lead to loop-
holes for multi-national corporations.
2. Proposed Provisions
The greater the international business realm gets, the greater
the need for universal anti-bribery legislation becomes. Therefore,
there should be one universal act, one with actual enforcement power.
While the OECD has the right idea, it simply urges countries along; it
has little power to actively enforce legislation. The ideal legislation
proposed by this Article would have the following key elements:
• Adequate Provisions – from the UKBA, to allow a company to in-
still procedures to combat bribery, and be rewarded for maintain-
ing that level of accountability.
• Alternative Enforcement – such as NPAs and DPAs from the
FCPA. This will encourage enforcement and provides a penalty
without complete debarment, which is more appropriate and effec-
tive under practical business circumstances.
• Compliance Defense and Voluntary Disclosures – from the UKBA.
A compliance defense has a similar rationale to the adequate provi-
sions. This provides that if a company notices problems and ac-
tively alters its programs to stop them right away and then works
with the government to remedy its mistakes, it should be given
some leniency during its investigation and prosecution.
119 The Extraterritorial Reach of the FCPA and the U.K. Bribery Act: Implications
for International Business, Arnold & Porter LLP 1-3 (2012), http://www.arnold
porter.com/resources/documents/Advisory%20Extraterritorial_Reach_FCPA_and_
UK_Bribery%20Act_Implications_International_Business.pdf.
120 Id. at 4–5.
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• Whistleblower Provisions – the FCPA has these incorporated via
the Dodd Frank Act.121 This is something that should be universal.
Whistleblower provisions hold companies accountable on a whole
new level, and would greatly lead to a reduction in anti-bribery
violations.
• Facilitating Payments – in an ideal world, the international stan-
dard would align with the UKBA and have a zero tolerance policy
for facilitating payments. In reality, some facilitating payments, if
minimal, not patterned, and not qualified as bribes, are simply the
cost of doing business in most countries. That being said, the move
would be to universalize what is acceptable with the goal of eventu-
ally eliminating facilitating payments completely.
• Bona Fide and Hospitality Expenditures – these issues are even
more important than facilitating payments and are not bribery. If
costs extend past a clear definition of bona fide expenditures then
there should be repercussions; however, if costs are simply normal
business costs that do not exceed to a level of bribery or induce-
ment to commit improper acts, then a company should not risk de-
barment for something as trivial as flying an official out to a board
meeting.
• Passive Offenses – the UKBA’s offense of failing to prevent a com-
mercial bribe is a great step in the right direction. It not only pe-
nalizes those who commit bribery, but also punishes those that
willfully allow it. This is a great way to combat bribery on an inter-
national scale.
• Criminal and Civil Enforcement – the FCPA’s system of equal
levels of criminal and civil enforcement is important and the most
effective way to attempt to combat bribery, as there are so many
different bribery violation types. This way all areas are covered
and no bribery act violations slip through the cracks simply be-
cause they are not quite to the level of a criminal violation.
These provisions are simply a suggestion for a universal act
that would potentially embody each important and effective provision
necessary to create a fully functioning universal legislation to combat
bribery. It would afford companies a realistic way to deal with their
internal compliance programs while maintaining an even broader set
of jurisdictional capabilities. This would place all multi-national corpo-
rations on a level playing field with a uniform act to combat corruption
in the international realm.
Individuals are tried for the crimes they commit once. Coun-
tries have to choose where to prosecute, and there is such a thing as
121 Ben Kerschberg, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Robust Whistleblowing Incentives,
FORBES (Apr. 14, 2011, 9:20AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/
04/14/the-dodd-frank-acts-robust-whistleblowing-incentives/.
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double jeopardy. But who has jurisdiction over these international
companies so they are protected from double jeopardy? One entity
should have jurisdiction over all international business. A universal
system to combat bribery in the international realm is imperative, and
should be implemented as soon as possible. The ideal would be to cre-
ate a piece of universal legislation with the above provisions that could
somehow maintain jurisdiction over each area of the international bus-
iness realm. The enforcement issue is one of the biggest critiques re-
garding the inconsistencies with these two acts, and in order to
effectively solve the problem, there needs to be an act that can actively
hold each country and company accountable to maintaining its provi-
sions. Whether this can be done through the WTO or the UN remains
an entirely different, but crucial argument. Clearly, the enforcement
power of the OECD is inadequate, so there needs to be a different en-
tity to harness this enforcement power, one that would have the power
to reach beyond its signatories and create an unprecedented expansive
extraterritorial reach. If that can be figured out and enacted using the
above provisions, international business can be saved.
V. CONCLUSION
While every company should be held liable for the bribes it
commits, it should not be penalized for failing to provide different in-
ternal procedures in each separate jurisdiction. The current system is
simply not practical in the ever-expanding international business
arena. If companies are continuously expected to comply with multiple
acts and their individual provisions and discrepancies, then there will
be no time left to conduct actual business in the global business world
and it will all be spent organizing compliance provisions for each indi-
vidual anti-bribery act. In order to conduct international business effi-
ciently and combat anti-bribery productively, there needs to be
universal enforcement. One with the exact provisions proposed above
might not be necessary, but action in this area is. The OECD has men-
tioned the idea, but their lack of available enforcement power creates a
serious problem. Universal alignment of anti-bribery legislation is im-
perative for international business to more effectively, and fairly, com-
bat corruption for all parties involved. What is needed is a remedy for
the OECD’s lack of enforcement capabilities. This can be done by in-
corporating the detailed and effective provisions of the FCPA and
UKBA (as listed above) into construction of a universal act with uni-
versal enforcement power, outlining each provision in black and white.
We need universality to combat worldwide corruption, and this needs
to happen quickly. If such an act can be implemented, either under the
purview of the WTO or the UN while maintaining a level of universal
enforcement power, it would inevitably save international business
from this growing bribery epidemic.
